Even after third remand, district court refuses to sentence defendant to term of imprisonment and insists on probation.

February 4th, 2010

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U.S. v. Livesay, 587 F.3d 1274 (11th Cir. 2009)

Giving new meaning to the phrase “some guys have all the luck,” this case involves a defendant who, in 2004, pled guilty to conspiracy to commit wire fraud, securities fraud, and falsifying books and records; falsely certifying financial information filed with the SEC; and a forfeiture count. At sentencing, the district court considered the PSI, which recommended a sentence from 78 to 97 months, 2 to 3 years of supervised release and a fine range of $12,500 to $1million and then granted the government’s motion for a downward departure and imposition of 60 months imprisonment. However, after the recommendations, the judge sentenced the defendant to 60 months of probation.

The government appealed and the Eleventh Circuit Court reversed, holding the district court failed to state reasons for its extreme downward departure. At the resentencing, the same district court judge imposed the same sentence as before. Again, the government appealed and the appellate court reversed, finding both the district court’s departure and the sentence imposed unreasonable given the defendant’s role in a massive fraud scheme.

The defendant filed a writ of certiorari and the Supreme Court granted the petition, vacated the appellate decision and remanded for reconsideration with Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007). At the second resentencing, the original judge recused himself. The new assigned judge agreed with the sentencing range of 78 to 97 months and granted the government’s 5k1 motion, yet only imposed 5 years of probation.

The government appealed for the third time and the appellate court, considering Gall, and the §3553(a)(2) factors, reversed, stating “only the imposition of a meaningful period of incarceration will meet the goals that Congress laid out in the sentencing statute”. To be continued.

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“Except” clause in 18 U.S.C. Section 924(c) does not limit consecutive sentences and does not violate the Double Jeopardy clause.

January 29th, 2010

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U.S. v. Tate, 586 F.3d 936 (11th Cir. 2009)

Convicted of four counts of armed bank robbery, three counts of using a firearm during a crime of violence, and one count of bank robbery, the defendant was sentenced to a total of 946 months to be served consecutively. Among other issues on appeal, the defendant maintained that the district court erred when it sentenced him to consecutive terms of imprisonment because the “except”  clause in 18 U.S.C Section 924 (c) only requires a total sentence of 25 years on the multiple violations of the section. Moreover, he argued that it was unreasonable for the district court not to vary downward under 18 U.S.C. Section 3553(a).

The appellate court disagreed with all of the defendant’s arguments on appeal, and affirmed the conviction and sentence imposed. The Court held that, in accordance with every circuit other than the Second Circuit, the plain language of Section 924(c) does not limit consecutive sentences imposed for the section offenses and underlying drug crimes and does not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause. It also found that the defendant failed to meet his burden of showing that the district court imposed an unreasonable sentence. Considering the totality of the circumstances, including the fact that the defendant’s criminal career began when he was a teen, the court considered the sentence substantively reasonable.

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Physical profiling of defendant permitted as long as not the sole reason for police encounter.

January 29th, 2010

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U.S. v. Quintana, 585 F.3d 1407 (11th Cir. 2009)

This defendant entered a conditional guilty plea and was convicted of illegally entering the U.S. after being previously removed following illegal entry. On appeal, the defendant argued that his right to equal protection was violated because he was only approached by police because they believed him to be of Middle Eastern descent or Muslim. The district court denied defendant’s motion to dismiss the indictment finding that the defendant’s ethnicity or religion was not the only basis for initiating an encounter. The appellate court, reviewing a motion to dismiss an indictment for abuse of discretion, reviewed the finding of fact for clear error. They determined that the totality of the circumstances known to the arresting officers were sufficient to justify a consensual encounter to decide whether further investigation might reveal criminal activity and therefore affirmed the district court’s finding that the defendant’s race or ethnicity was not the sole reason for the police encounter.

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Walkaway conviction not a crime of violence under ACCA.

January 12th, 2010

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U.S. v. Lee, 586 F.3d 859 (11th Cir. 2009)

Defendant was convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm and sentenced to 180 months in prison. On appeal, he argued that the district court erroneously denied his motion to suppress the gun found in his co-defendant’s vehicle and abused its discretion by allowing improper jury instructions. The defendant also challenged his sentence arguing that his prior NJ convictions did not meet the standard under the ACCA to enhance his sentence.

The appellate court held that because the defendant, a passenger, had no legitimate expectation of privacy in the interior of the vehicle, he neither had a privacy expectation of the glove box, and lacked standing to challenge the search.

The appellate court also found that the district court’s jury instructions constituted an accurate statement of the law and therefore did not warrant reversal.

Lastly, the appellate court examined the defendant’s NJ prior walkaway conviction to determine it if fit within the ACCA’s enumerated crimes. It found that “a non-violent walkaway escape from unsecured custody is not sufficiently similar in kind or degree of risk posed to the ACCA’s enumerated crimes to bring it within its residual provision.” Therefore, the appellate court vacated defendant’s sentence and remanded back to the district court for resentencing.

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Sixth Amendment guarantee of representation allows defendant to pay legal fees with alleged illegal proceeds.

January 11th, 2010

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U.S. v. Velez, 586 F.3d 875 (11th Cir. 2009)
On an issue of first impression for the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, the Court held that the plain language of 18 U.S.C.A. § 1957(a) (f) (1) exempts monetary transactions derived from criminal proceeds and used to secure legal representation. In this case, the defendant, an accused Colombian drug leader, paid his legal defense fees with alleged laundered money. The government then indicted the defendant and his two attorneys on one count of money laundering charges. The District Court dismissed Count One, finding that 1957 (f)(1) clearly excludes from its scope, “any transaction necessary to preserve a person’s right to representation as guaranteed by the sixth amendment to the Constitution.” The Government argued that the exemption was nullified by Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States,491 U.S. 617, 626 (1989). The Appellate Court disagreed finding that Caplin & Drysdale addressed criminal proceeds with respect to the civil forfeiture statute, 21 U.S.C. § 853 and therefore had no bearing on 18 U.S.C. §1957 and one’s representation guaranteed by the sixth amendment.

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Child pornography defendant diagnosed paraphiliac yet low risk re-offender and sentenced at statutory minimum.

November 25th, 2009

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U.S. v. RILEY, —F.Supp. 2d—2009 WL 2899896 (S.D. Fla. September 4, 2009)


A twenty-four year old married man initiated an instant messaging conversation with an undercover FBI agent posing as single mother with a 10 year old daughter. He expressed an interest in engaging in sexual activity with the agent and daughter and sent four pornographic pictures, including 2 depicting children 5 years or younger engaged in sexual activity with adult males. After making contact with the defendant, FBI agents discovered an additional 900 images of child pornography on his computer as well as 10 videos. Consequently, the defendant lost his job as an inventory manager at Walmart.
The defendant had been attending psychiatric therapy sessions, where it was opined that defendant was an excellent candidate for a community based treatment program, did not pose a risk of acting out sexually with children, and that his risk of re-offending was low. Another professional, who conducted a Sex Offender Specific Psychological Evaluation, opined that although the defendant qualified for a diagnosis of a paraphilia, he represented a low risk of re-offending and could be safely maintained in the community with supervision and outpatient mental health treatment.
The PSI calculated the offense level to be 37, making Guidelines range 210-260 months, but the statutory maximum was 240 the range was 210-240 months. Quoting at length from United States v. Hanson, 562 F.Supp. 2d 1004 (E.D. Wis. 2008), the court agreed with recent judicial criticism of Section 2G2.2 “which weighs against imposing a sentence within the Guideline recommendation.” The court concluded that a sentence at the near maximum should be reserved for the worst offenders and not those that are typical in this type of case. After reviewing the factors under §3553(a)(2), the court found that a sentence at the statutory minimum was a serious punishment and that it would adequately deter the defendant and others from committing the crime.

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District court’s unique handling of bench and jury trial at same time deemed appropriate by Eleventh Circuit.

November 25th, 2009

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U.S. v. CHAVEZ, —F.3d—2009 WL 3320314 (11th Cir. October 16, 2009)

Mr. Galvan Chavez, one of nine defendants charged in a nineteen count indictment, among other challenges, argued on appeal that the district court denied his right to a fair trial when it denied his motion for a severance from the four defendant’s who proceeded to trial alongside him. Mr. Chavez pled not guilty to all charges and was convicted of all charges. However, the four co-defendants plead guilty to all counts, reserving their right to a bench trial regarding the quantity of contraband alleged in the drug conspiracy, the central offense charged in Count one of the indictment.
Presented with a unique situation, the district court ordered that each defendant, with respective counsel, be present for all phases of the trial; it instructed the jury that all defendants were charged in Count 1 but did not tell the jury that the four co-defendant’s entered guilty pleas on Count 1; and it instructed the jury that they were to consider their verdict only as to Mr. Galvan Chavez.
The appellate court reviewed the district court’s denial of Mr. Chavez’ motion for severance and found that it was not supported by any theory of relief nor did it prove specific and compelling prejudice, but rather argued that Mr. Chavez might have had a better chance of acquittal if the cases were severed. The appellate court also affirmed the district court’s rulings on Mr. Chavez’ other contentions as well as upheld the sentences for the four co-defendants.

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Neither 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a) nor SORNA exceed Congress’ Commerce Clause power.

November 25th, 2009

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U.S. v. MYERS, —F.3d—2009 WL 3270005 (11th Cir. October 13, 2009)

The district court recently held that a defendant’s charge of §2250 (traveling in interstate commerce) and failure to adhere to SORNA’s sex offender registration requirements under 42 U.S.C. §16913 exceeded Congress’ authority and dismissed the government’s indictment. However, on appeal, the Eleventh Circuit held that the Ambert case, 561 F.3d 1202 (11th Cir. 2009) is still good law (upholding 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a) and 42 U.S.C. §16913 to a Commerce Clause challenge).

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Guidelines Section 3B1.1 role enhancement as an organizer or leader requires findings to be based on reliable and specific evidence.

November 25th, 2009

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U.S. v. MARTINEZ, 584 F.3d 1022 (11th Cir. October 5, 2009)

The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the sentence and remanded the defendant’s case back to the district court for clear error based on its determination that the defendant was subject to a Section 3B1.1 role enhancement as an organizer or leader with respect to his conviction for conspiring to distribute and to possess with intent to distribute 100 kilograms or more of marijuana. The defendant pleaded guilty to the one count indictment of the above mentioned offense and admitted to having “orchestrated” weekly mail shipments of marijuana from Texas to Central Florida. At sentencing, the government relied entirely on the PSI report, recommended the role enhancement and characterized the entire conspiracy as the defendants’. The defendant objected to each finding that argued for the four-level enhancement and renewed those objections at the sentencing. However, the district court rejected the defendant’s objections, adopted the PSI findings, and sentenced the defendant to 78 months imprisonment.
On appeal, the defendant argued that the government failed to meet its burden by preponderance of the evidence that the defendant exercised control, influence, or decision making over another participant in the conspiracy. The court found that the government failed to establish the disputed fact or any of the essential factual statements in the PSI, nor did it establish any of the seven factors identified in Comment Four of Section 3B1.1: 1)decision making authority, 2) nature of participation, 3) recruitment, 4) larger share in profits, 5) degree of participation in planning and organizing, 6) nature and scope of the offense, and 7) the degree of control and authority exercised. The court instructed the district court to base its findings on reliable and specific evidence rather than conclusory language in the PSI and sparse evidence.

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“Serious drug offense” under ACCA, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), requires court’s examination of prior offense’s statutory definition and fact of conviction, not underlying actual facts, unless ambiguous.

November 25th, 2009

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U.S. v. ROBINSON, 583 F.3d 1292 (11th Cir. September 30, 2009)

Sentenced to 210 months imprisonment for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, the defendant appealed and challenged his sentence enhancement under ACCA, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). Previously, the defendant had been convicted twice for burglary and once for possession of marijuana for other than personal use under Alabama state law. He argued that his prior drug conviction was not a “serious drug offense” so as to trigger the ACCA because the offense charged, by “other than personal use” did not specifically delineate “distribution”. The Eleventh Circuit stated that in determining whether a particular conviction qualifies as a serious drug offense, the court only looks to the statutory definition of the prior offense and the fact of conviction, not the underlying actual facts, unless the judgment of conviction and statute are ambiguous. The Court found the conviction and statute to be unambiguous. Moreover, since the Alabama legislature created separate statutes applicable to marijuana offenses, rather than applying the more general statutes for controlled substance offenses which list possession and distribution as distinct crimes, the court properly interpreted defendant’s prior conviction to include both possession and distribution of marijuana. Thus, the ACCA enhancement was proper.

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