Archive for August, 2009

A two-level enhancement was not impermissible double-counting.

Tuesday, August 11th, 2009

U.S. v. Demarest, 570 F.3d 1232 (11th Cir. June 10, 2009)

The defendant appealed his conviction and sentence for three counts of money laundering. The court found that the defendant’s physical and mental efforts on the day in question demonstrated that he was not overly intoxicated. Secondly, the jury was entitled to believe that the defendant was predisposed to commit the crime and not entrapped. Lastly, the defendant’s reliance on case law was misplaced and the evidence established that laundered funds were proceeds of illegal drug trafficking.

The District Court did not err in enhancing defendant’s sentence.

The two-level enhancement was not impermissible double-counting as defendant’s violation under Section 1956 was not factored into his base level since the money laundering statutes are not distinguishable with regard to the defendant’s base level. Moreover, defendant’s statements and behavior prove he believed the laundered funds were or were intended to be proceeds of illegal drugs.

Carrying a concealed firearm and escape are not properly considered violent felonies so as to trigger a sentence enhancement under ACCA.

Tuesday, August 11th, 2009

U.S. v. Canty, 570 F.3d 1251 (11th Cir. June 11, 2009)

The defendant was convicted of possessing counterfeit federal reserve notes and being a felon in possession of a firearm. The government argued to enhance his sentence under the ACCA (Armed Career Criminal Act). The defendant was sentenced, pursuant to ACCA, to 186 months in prison on each count, to be served concurrently. Case law dictated that carrying a concealed weapon could not be a crime of violence under the Guidelines and the court read the definition of violent felony under ACCA Section 924 to be virtually identical to the definition of crime of violence. Therefore, the defendant’s crimes were considered violent felonies or serious drug offenses to apply under the statute.

The government had the opportunity to offer evidence and seek rulings from the sentencing court, but failed to do so.

The government did not voice any objection to predicate the ACCA enhancements or offer whether the crimes were committed on occasions different from one another. Rather, the government adopted the PSR. Therefore, it was not entitled to a remand to present additional evidence and seek additional findings to support an enhancement when it failed to do so when the initial sentence was imposed.

Court finds convictions for both “receiving” and “possessing” child pornography do not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment.

Monday, August 10th, 2009

U.S. v. Bobb, 2009 WL 2391918 (August 6, 2009)

The defendant was convicted on both charges and sentenced to 96 months imprisonment and five years’ supervised release. Defendant appealed and argued that he received multiple punishments for the same offense. The defendant argued that it is impossible to receive a thing, without, at least the very instant of receipt, also possessing it and thus possession is a lesser included offense of receipt. Considering defendant’s argument, the Court looked to the statutory construction of each provision and then to legislative intent and found that, in concurrence with the Third and Ninth Circuits, Congress did not intend to punish a defendant twice for the same criminal act. However, in the instant case, the defendant was charged with two separate offenses on two separate dates, therefore the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the convictions and sentences.

District court must consider Section 3553(a) factors in deciding to reduce a sentence under Amendment 706.

Friday, August 7th, 2009

U.S. v. Douglas, 2009 WL 2244519 (July 29, 2009)

The defendant was sentenced to 188 months for crack-cocaine conviction and filed a motion to reduce his sentence under Amendment 709 to the Sentencing Guidelines. The District Court summarily granted the motion without a hearing or a response from the government. The court used a standard form order but did not mention 18 U.S.C. Section 3553(a) or the factors, nor did it explain its decision to sentence the defendant to 162 months-the high end of the recalculated guidelines. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the District Court’s refusal to grant defendant’s request for a sentence below the amended guidelines range, but vacated the newly imposed sentence and remanded back to the district court for further consideration of the Section 3553(a) factors and explanation.