Archive for October, 2009

Supervised release does not run during period of imprisonment unless period is less than 30 consecutive days.

Wednesday, October 21st, 2009

U.S. v. JOHNSON, 2009 WL 2767048 (11th Cir. September 2, 2009)

The defendant challenged his supervised release sentence revocation on the ground that he had completed his three years of supervised release prior to the date of the supervised release revocation petition. Defendant had transferred to a Virginia state facility, on detainer, to answer pending criminal charges, after release from serving his federal sentence. The defendant remained in state custody until he plead guilty in Virginia, was sentenced, released, and credited for time served under the detainer. Subsequently, the defendant was arrested for fraud and forgery charges and Probation filed a petition to revoke his supervised release. At the revocation hearing, the defendant argued that the district court lacked jurisdiction because his three year supervised release term had already expired and the time in custody in Virginia did not toll that term. The district court disagreed and revoked his supervised release. On appeal, the defendant argued that his three year supervised release term began running when he was released from federal prison. In its decision, the Eleventh Circuit relied on a Supreme Court decision in 2000 which held that “[a] term of supervised release does not run during any period in which the person is imprisoned in connection with a conviction for a Federal, State, or local crime unless the imprisonment is for a period of less than 30 consecutive days.” The Court found the defendant’s Virginia sentencing order mandated two years imprisonment, which was more than 30 days. As such, the term of supervised release did not run during the time he was in state custody.

Failure by the trial Court to include all statutory elements of aggravated identity theft in a jury instruction was not harmless error.

Wednesday, October 21st, 2009

U.S. v. GOMEZ, 2009 WL 2633039, (11th Cir. August 28, 2009)

The Eleventh Circuit vacated the defendant’s conviction for aggravated identity theft and remanded the case back to the district court because the district court erred when it found harmless the failure to include all statutory elements of the offense in the jury instruction. The defendant argued on appeal that the government failed to prove that he knew the identification he used belonged to another person. The defendant’s proposed jury charge read: “the term ‘knowingly’…means knowledge by the defendant that the identification belonged to a real person.” However, the district court refused to read the instruction because it stated that knowledge was not a requirement in the Eleventh Circuit. The appellate court held that the jury could have found that the government failed to prove that the defendant knew the identification documents he used belonged to another person because the defendant contested this issue.

State’s regulation for safety inspections of commercial motor vehicles was adequate substitute for warrant under Fourth Amendment.

Wednesday, October 21st, 2009

U.S. v. PONCE-ALDONA, 2009 WL 2450282 (11th Cir. August 12, 2009)

The defendant conditionally pled guilty to drug charges but on appeal argued that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress because the initial stop did not fall under the administrative search exception to the warrant requirement under the Fourth Amendment. The appellate court examined the district court’s denial of the motion to suppress and found that the Georgia statute’s regulatory scheme as a whole, including the incorporated federal regulations, satisfied the third prong of the Burger test) for compatibility with the Fourth Amendment (The defendant did not raise any challenges to the first or second prong). The Georgia statue provided notice to owners that their vehicles would be searched on a regular basis, and that the time, place, and scope of the inspections placed proper restraints upon the inspecting officer’s discretion.