Archive for the ‘Jury Instructions’ Category

Walkaway conviction not a crime of violence under ACCA.

Tuesday, January 12th, 2010

U.S. v. Lee, 586 F.3d 859 (11th Cir. 2009)

Defendant was convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm and sentenced to 180 months in prison. On appeal, he argued that the district court erroneously denied his motion to suppress the gun found in his co-defendant’s vehicle and abused its discretion by allowing improper jury instructions. The defendant also challenged his sentence arguing that his prior NJ convictions did not meet the standard under the ACCA to enhance his sentence.

The appellate court held that because the defendant, a passenger, had no legitimate expectation of privacy in the interior of the vehicle, he neither had a privacy expectation of the glove box, and lacked standing to challenge the search.

The appellate court also found that the district court’s jury instructions constituted an accurate statement of the law and therefore did not warrant reversal.

Lastly, the appellate court examined the defendant’s NJ prior walkaway conviction to determine it if fit within the ACCA’s enumerated crimes. It found that “a non-violent walkaway escape from unsecured custody is not sufficiently similar in kind or degree of risk posed to the ACCA’s enumerated crimes to bring it within its residual provision.” Therefore, the appellate court vacated defendant’s sentence and remanded back to the district court for resentencing.

District court’s unique handling of bench and jury trial at same time deemed appropriate by Eleventh Circuit.

Wednesday, November 25th, 2009

U.S. v. CHAVEZ, —F.3d—2009 WL 3320314 (11th Cir. October 16, 2009)

Mr. Galvan Chavez, one of nine defendants charged in a nineteen count indictment, among other challenges, argued on appeal that the district court denied his right to a fair trial when it denied his motion for a severance from the four defendant’s who proceeded to trial alongside him. Mr. Chavez pled not guilty to all charges and was convicted of all charges. However, the four co-defendants plead guilty to all counts, reserving their right to a bench trial regarding the quantity of contraband alleged in the drug conspiracy, the central offense charged in Count one of the indictment.
Presented with a unique situation, the district court ordered that each defendant, with respective counsel, be present for all phases of the trial; it instructed the jury that all defendants were charged in Count 1 but did not tell the jury that the four co-defendant’s entered guilty pleas on Count 1; and it instructed the jury that they were to consider their verdict only as to Mr. Galvan Chavez.
The appellate court reviewed the district court’s denial of Mr. Chavez’ motion for severance and found that it was not supported by any theory of relief nor did it prove specific and compelling prejudice, but rather argued that Mr. Chavez might have had a better chance of acquittal if the cases were severed. The appellate court also affirmed the district court’s rulings on Mr. Chavez’ other contentions as well as upheld the sentences for the four co-defendants.

Failure by the trial Court to include all statutory elements of aggravated identity theft in a jury instruction was not harmless error.

Wednesday, October 21st, 2009

U.S. v. GOMEZ, 2009 WL 2633039, (11th Cir. August 28, 2009)

The Eleventh Circuit vacated the defendant’s conviction for aggravated identity theft and remanded the case back to the district court because the district court erred when it found harmless the failure to include all statutory elements of the offense in the jury instruction. The defendant argued on appeal that the government failed to prove that he knew the identification he used belonged to another person. The defendant’s proposed jury charge read: “the term ‘knowingly’…means knowledge by the defendant that the identification belonged to a real person.” However, the district court refused to read the instruction because it stated that knowledge was not a requirement in the Eleventh Circuit. The appellate court held that the jury could have found that the government failed to prove that the defendant knew the identification documents he used belonged to another person because the defendant contested this issue.

Promotional money laundering and Concealment money laundering are two separate offenses that do not require a special verdict form or a specific unanimity instruction to the jury.

Tuesday, September 8th, 2009

U.S. v. Felts, 2009 WL 2568362 (August 21, 2009)

The defendant was convicted of conspiracy to commit money laundering, money laundering, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon and was sentenced to 210 months imprisonment. Appealing his conviction and sentence, the defendant contended that the district court improperly instructed the jury on the money laundering offenses because promotional and concealment money laundering are two separate offenses and should not have been submitted to the jury as a single charge. The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed defendant’s conviction and sentence but specifically addressed the propriety of the jury instructions, reviewing for plain error. The Court found minimal distinction between using money to promote unlawful activity and using it to conceal or disguise unlawful activity, therefore it was unnecessary to instruct a jury to unanimously agree to which mental state the defendant possessed, i.e. there was no error, plain or otherwise.

The En banc Court reversed the panel decision that overturned a fraud conviction for the failure to give the defense requested jury instruction.

Monday, April 27th, 2009

U.S. v. SVETE, 556 F.3d 1157 (11th Cir. 2009)

The panel reversed the conviction because the pattern jury instructions failed to instruct concerning whether it was reasonable for prudent investors to rely on defendants’ statements. The panel held that the inaccuracy in the jury instruction impaired the defendants’ ability to argue that, in light of the available documentation, it was unreasonable for any prudent investor to have relied on the defendants’ contrary statements, or not to seek independent advice. Svete, 521 F.3d 1302. The en banc Court reversed the panel, finding that the mail fraud statute does not require proof that a scheme to defraud would deceive persons of ordinary intelligence. A jury must only find that the scheme would have deceived a prudent and ordinary investor, and not simply one who may be gullible.

The Eleventh Circuit reversed two bribery related convictions of the former governor of Alabama.

Monday, April 27th, 2009

U.S. v. SIEGELMAN, 2009 WL 564659 (March 6, 2009)

The Court found that he should not have been convicted of honest services mail fraud based on Richard Scrushy’s self dealing once Scrushy became a member of the Board of Health Review. Siegelman had a lack of involvement in Scrushy’s self dealing and there was no agreement between the two at this point.

Denial of defense jury instruction upheld.

Siegelman wanted a jury instruction for the bribery charge stating that a quid pro quo agreement must be express. The Court noted that the case law merely requires an “explicit” agreement which can be achieved through winks and nods, if not express words. Furthermore, an agreement can be implied from words and actions

Denial of statute of limitations challenge upheld.

The Court rejected Siegelman’s statute of limitations challenge, noting that he failed to raise it until the filing of the motion for judgment of acquittal under Fed. R. Crim. P. 29(c), post verdict. If a defendant fails to raise the statute of limitations defense at trial, the defense is waived.

Sentencing upward departure upheld.

The Court affirmed an upward sentencing departure based on the fact that the Governor’s conduct had seriously undermined public confidence in the executive branch of the Alabama government.

Court finds that evidence supports a jury instruction that states “fear of economic loss” in a Hobbs Act prosecution.

Monday, April 27th, 2009

U.S. v. BORNSCHEUER , 2009 WL 814587 (11th Cir. March 31, 2009)

The defendants were charged with extortion in violation of the Hobbs Act. The defendants were German businessmen who purchased a Florida corporation owned by another German citizen, living in Florida at the time of the events that gave rise to this prosecution. One of the defendants borrowed part of the purchase price from German investors and he financed the balance by giving the seller a mortgage on his property together with a note. Eventually, the defendants demanded that the seller/victim rescind the purchase and cancel the purchase mortgage, claiming the defendants’ financial backers were demanding payment. To persuade the seller to comply, they described their investors as dangerous underworld figures who would do anything to recover their money and warned the seller he better comply or his family would be at risk. The defendants’ appeal involved his challenge to the district court’s refusal to delete from the jury instruction on the Hobbs Act elements the words “fear of economic loss.” The appellate court rejected this argument as it found there was evidence that the victim feared the possibility of suffering economic loss by the defendants’ actions.