Archive for the ‘Sentencing Guidelines’ Category

Even after third remand, district court refuses to sentence defendant to term of imprisonment and insists on probation.

Thursday, February 4th, 2010

U.S. v. Livesay, 587 F.3d 1274 (11th Cir. 2009)

Giving new meaning to the phrase “some guys have all the luck,” this case involves a defendant who, in 2004, pled guilty to conspiracy to commit wire fraud, securities fraud, and falsifying books and records; falsely certifying financial information filed with the SEC; and a forfeiture count. At sentencing, the district court considered the PSI, which recommended a sentence from 78 to 97 months, 2 to 3 years of supervised release and a fine range of $12,500 to $1million and then granted the government’s motion for a downward departure and imposition of 60 months imprisonment. However, after the recommendations, the judge sentenced the defendant to 60 months of probation.

The government appealed and the Eleventh Circuit Court reversed, holding the district court failed to state reasons for its extreme downward departure. At the resentencing, the same district court judge imposed the same sentence as before. Again, the government appealed and the appellate court reversed, finding both the district court’s departure and the sentence imposed unreasonable given the defendant’s role in a massive fraud scheme.

The defendant filed a writ of certiorari and the Supreme Court granted the petition, vacated the appellate decision and remanded for reconsideration with Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007). At the second resentencing, the original judge recused himself. The new assigned judge agreed with the sentencing range of 78 to 97 months and granted the government’s 5k1 motion, yet only imposed 5 years of probation.

The government appealed for the third time and the appellate court, considering Gall, and the §3553(a)(2) factors, reversed, stating “only the imposition of a meaningful period of incarceration will meet the goals that Congress laid out in the sentencing statute”. To be continued.

“Except” clause in 18 U.S.C. Section 924(c) does not limit consecutive sentences and does not violate the Double Jeopardy clause.

Friday, January 29th, 2010

U.S. v. Tate, 586 F.3d 936 (11th Cir. 2009)

Convicted of four counts of armed bank robbery, three counts of using a firearm during a crime of violence, and one count of bank robbery, the defendant was sentenced to a total of 946 months to be served consecutively. Among other issues on appeal, the defendant maintained that the district court erred when it sentenced him to consecutive terms of imprisonment because the “except”  clause in 18 U.S.C Section 924 (c) only requires a total sentence of 25 years on the multiple violations of the section. Moreover, he argued that it was unreasonable for the district court not to vary downward under 18 U.S.C. Section 3553(a).

The appellate court disagreed with all of the defendant’s arguments on appeal, and affirmed the conviction and sentence imposed. The Court held that, in accordance with every circuit other than the Second Circuit, the plain language of Section 924(c) does not limit consecutive sentences imposed for the section offenses and underlying drug crimes and does not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause. It also found that the defendant failed to meet his burden of showing that the district court imposed an unreasonable sentence. Considering the totality of the circumstances, including the fact that the defendant’s criminal career began when he was a teen, the court considered the sentence substantively reasonable.

Walkaway conviction not a crime of violence under ACCA.

Tuesday, January 12th, 2010

U.S. v. Lee, 586 F.3d 859 (11th Cir. 2009)

Defendant was convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm and sentenced to 180 months in prison. On appeal, he argued that the district court erroneously denied his motion to suppress the gun found in his co-defendant’s vehicle and abused its discretion by allowing improper jury instructions. The defendant also challenged his sentence arguing that his prior NJ convictions did not meet the standard under the ACCA to enhance his sentence.

The appellate court held that because the defendant, a passenger, had no legitimate expectation of privacy in the interior of the vehicle, he neither had a privacy expectation of the glove box, and lacked standing to challenge the search.

The appellate court also found that the district court’s jury instructions constituted an accurate statement of the law and therefore did not warrant reversal.

Lastly, the appellate court examined the defendant’s NJ prior walkaway conviction to determine it if fit within the ACCA’s enumerated crimes. It found that “a non-violent walkaway escape from unsecured custody is not sufficiently similar in kind or degree of risk posed to the ACCA’s enumerated crimes to bring it within its residual provision.” Therefore, the appellate court vacated defendant’s sentence and remanded back to the district court for resentencing.

Child pornography defendant diagnosed paraphiliac yet low risk re-offender and sentenced at statutory minimum.

Wednesday, November 25th, 2009

U.S. v. RILEY, —F.Supp. 2d—2009 WL 2899896 (S.D. Fla. September 4, 2009)


A twenty-four year old married man initiated an instant messaging conversation with an undercover FBI agent posing as single mother with a 10 year old daughter. He expressed an interest in engaging in sexual activity with the agent and daughter and sent four pornographic pictures, including 2 depicting children 5 years or younger engaged in sexual activity with adult males. After making contact with the defendant, FBI agents discovered an additional 900 images of child pornography on his computer as well as 10 videos. Consequently, the defendant lost his job as an inventory manager at Walmart.
The defendant had been attending psychiatric therapy sessions, where it was opined that defendant was an excellent candidate for a community based treatment program, did not pose a risk of acting out sexually with children, and that his risk of re-offending was low. Another professional, who conducted a Sex Offender Specific Psychological Evaluation, opined that although the defendant qualified for a diagnosis of a paraphilia, he represented a low risk of re-offending and could be safely maintained in the community with supervision and outpatient mental health treatment.
The PSI calculated the offense level to be 37, making Guidelines range 210-260 months, but the statutory maximum was 240 the range was 210-240 months. Quoting at length from United States v. Hanson, 562 F.Supp. 2d 1004 (E.D. Wis. 2008), the court agreed with recent judicial criticism of Section 2G2.2 “which weighs against imposing a sentence within the Guideline recommendation.” The court concluded that a sentence at the near maximum should be reserved for the worst offenders and not those that are typical in this type of case. After reviewing the factors under §3553(a)(2), the court found that a sentence at the statutory minimum was a serious punishment and that it would adequately deter the defendant and others from committing the crime.

“Serious drug offense” under ACCA, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), requires court’s examination of prior offense’s statutory definition and fact of conviction, not underlying actual facts, unless ambiguous.

Wednesday, November 25th, 2009

U.S. v. ROBINSON, 583 F.3d 1292 (11th Cir. September 30, 2009)

Sentenced to 210 months imprisonment for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, the defendant appealed and challenged his sentence enhancement under ACCA, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). Previously, the defendant had been convicted twice for burglary and once for possession of marijuana for other than personal use under Alabama state law. He argued that his prior drug conviction was not a “serious drug offense” so as to trigger the ACCA because the offense charged, by “other than personal use” did not specifically delineate “distribution”. The Eleventh Circuit stated that in determining whether a particular conviction qualifies as a serious drug offense, the court only looks to the statutory definition of the prior offense and the fact of conviction, not the underlying actual facts, unless the judgment of conviction and statute are ambiguous. The Court found the conviction and statute to be unambiguous. Moreover, since the Alabama legislature created separate statutes applicable to marijuana offenses, rather than applying the more general statutes for controlled substance offenses which list possession and distribution as distinct crimes, the court properly interpreted defendant’s prior conviction to include both possession and distribution of marijuana. Thus, the ACCA enhancement was proper.

Congress has power to regulate internet and prohibit use for harmful or immoral purposes regardless of whether purpose has primarily intrastate impact.

Wednesday, November 25th, 2009

U.S. v. Faris, 583 F.3d 756 (11th Cir. September 23, 2009)

The defendant appealed his conviction for using a facility of interstate commerce to entice a minor to engage in sexual activity and his 292-month sentence, arguing that 18 U.S.C. Section 2242(b), which prohibits using any means of interstate commerce to entice, or coerce a minor to engage in “any sexual activity for which any person can be charged with a criminal offense,” violates both the Commerce Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause of the Constitution. The defendant contended that his internet connections, telephone calls, emails, and travel routes were confined within Florida state lines and did not affect interstate commerce.
The Eleventh Circuit dismissed this argument as “meritless” stating that “Congress has the power to regulate the internet” which is “an instrumentality of interstate commerce.” Further, the defendant argued that since the Tenth Amendment delegates to the states responsibility to regulate wholly intrastate activity, it is not necessary and proper for Congress to do so. The district court also applied a two-level enhancement for “undue influence,” which the defendant challenged, but the appellate court affirmed, because the defendant utilized his knowledge of the internet and computers to make contact with another whom he believed would supply minors for sex.

“Except” clause in firearm statute to prevent consecutive mandatory minimum sentences for multiple firearm offenses, not firearm offense and underlying drug crimes.

Wednesday, November 25th, 2009

U.S. v. SEGARRA, 582 F.3d 1269 (11th Cir. September 15, 2009)

The Eleventh Circuit court of Appeals dismissed the defendant’s appeal as barred by the appeal waiver in his plea agreement. Defendant pled guilty to possession with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of crack cocaine, and possession of firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking offense. The plea barred direct or collateral appeal unless the sentence imposed exceeded the guidelines range determined by the court or exceeded the statutory maximum. The district court sentenced the defendant to 120 months for crack offense and a mandatory 60 month term for a firearm offense, to be served consecutively. The defendant argued on appeal that the imposition of consecutive sentences therefore exceeded the statutory maximum sentence and the applicable guidelines range. However, the Eleventh Circuit held that because the consecutive sentences were mandatory and the term of imprisonment for the firearm offense was set by statute, the sentence imposed did not exceed the statutory maximum permitted or the applicable guidelines range; defendant’s argument on appeal does not fit within any of the appeal waiver exceptions.

A two-level enhancement was not impermissible double-counting.

Tuesday, August 11th, 2009

U.S. v. Demarest, 570 F.3d 1232 (11th Cir. June 10, 2009)

The defendant appealed his conviction and sentence for three counts of money laundering. The court found that the defendant’s physical and mental efforts on the day in question demonstrated that he was not overly intoxicated. Secondly, the jury was entitled to believe that the defendant was predisposed to commit the crime and not entrapped. Lastly, the defendant’s reliance on case law was misplaced and the evidence established that laundered funds were proceeds of illegal drug trafficking.

The District Court did not err in enhancing defendant’s sentence.

The two-level enhancement was not impermissible double-counting as defendant’s violation under Section 1956 was not factored into his base level since the money laundering statutes are not distinguishable with regard to the defendant’s base level. Moreover, defendant’s statements and behavior prove he believed the laundered funds were or were intended to be proceeds of illegal drugs.

Carrying a concealed firearm and escape are not properly considered violent felonies so as to trigger a sentence enhancement under ACCA.

Tuesday, August 11th, 2009

U.S. v. Canty, 570 F.3d 1251 (11th Cir. June 11, 2009)

The defendant was convicted of possessing counterfeit federal reserve notes and being a felon in possession of a firearm. The government argued to enhance his sentence under the ACCA (Armed Career Criminal Act). The defendant was sentenced, pursuant to ACCA, to 186 months in prison on each count, to be served concurrently. Case law dictated that carrying a concealed weapon could not be a crime of violence under the Guidelines and the court read the definition of violent felony under ACCA Section 924 to be virtually identical to the definition of crime of violence. Therefore, the defendant’s crimes were considered violent felonies or serious drug offenses to apply under the statute.

The government had the opportunity to offer evidence and seek rulings from the sentencing court, but failed to do so.

The government did not voice any objection to predicate the ACCA enhancements or offer whether the crimes were committed on occasions different from one another. Rather, the government adopted the PSR. Therefore, it was not entitled to a remand to present additional evidence and seek additional findings to support an enhancement when it failed to do so when the initial sentence was imposed.

Court finds convictions for both “receiving” and “possessing” child pornography do not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment.

Monday, August 10th, 2009

U.S. v. Bobb, 2009 WL 2391918 (August 6, 2009)

The defendant was convicted on both charges and sentenced to 96 months imprisonment and five years’ supervised release. Defendant appealed and argued that he received multiple punishments for the same offense. The defendant argued that it is impossible to receive a thing, without, at least the very instant of receipt, also possessing it and thus possession is a lesser included offense of receipt. Considering defendant’s argument, the Court looked to the statutory construction of each provision and then to legislative intent and found that, in concurrence with the Third and Ninth Circuits, Congress did not intend to punish a defendant twice for the same criminal act. However, in the instant case, the defendant was charged with two separate offenses on two separate dates, therefore the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the convictions and sentences.