Posts Tagged ‘minor’

Defendant’s conviction for sending obscene nude photos of himself to persons he believed to be young girls did not require sex offender registration as a condition of supervised release.

Monday, May 4th, 2009

UNITED STATES V. DODGE,  08-10802, (January 14, 2009.)

The defendant pled to a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1470 for transferring obscene material to a person he believed to be a minor. Over the period of a year, the defendant interacted on internet chat-rooms with persons he took to be young girls aged 13-14 years old. On at least three occasions, Dodge either emailed photographs of himself totally nude and/or masturbating or provided a link to such photos. As part of his 18 month sentence, the district court ordered a three year supervised release and ordered Dodge to register as a sex offender “for up to life” pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 16911(7)(I).

The Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court’s sex offender registration requirement finding that under the facts of the offense, this was not “by its nature a sex offense against a minor.” While Dodge’s actions may have been “offensive and deplorable” they lacked “any element of an unwanted sexual assault, offense, or other violation that contacts or opposes a minor’s rights.”

Court finds U.S.S.G. Section 2246(D) clearly indicates that Congress used the phrase “any person” when it meant to include the offender himself, as well as another individual, and the phrase “another person” when it meant to exclude the offender.

Wednesday, April 29th, 2009

U.S. v. Aldrich, (11th Circuit Ct. Appeals, April 27, 2009)

This is an appeal from a 168- month sentence for violation of 18 U.S.C. 2422(b), using a computer to entice a minor to engage in sexual activity. The defendant argued that the district court erred in applying a two-level enhancement at sentencing under U.S.S.G. 2G2.1(b)(2)(A) because the statute language was ambiguous. He also raised a due process challenge based on an “inaccurate” statement in his PSI.

The defendant challenged that his behavior (masturbation) did not warrant the enhancement because his behavior did not fall within the guideline that states: “the commission of a sexual act or sexual contact,” where “sexual contact” is defined as “the intentional touching…of the genitalia, anus, groin, breast, inner thigh, or buttocks of any person with an intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person.” The defendant insisted that “any person” could not include oneself because it was not possible for the defendant to “harass” himself. He argued that all six prohibited acts must be performed in order to violate the statute.

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the District Court, finding that the use of the phrase “any person” in the Section 2246(3) definition of “sexual contact” demonstrates Congress’ intent to include masturbation among the acts to which the definition and the Section 2G2.1(b)(2)(A) enhancement was to apply. Moreover, the Court ruled that Section 2246(3) uses the conjunction “or” instead of “and” in its list of potential motives; therefore a defendant need only intend to “abuse, humiliate, degrade, or arouse or gratify” in order to violate the statute.

Defendant’s second argument stated that the PSI contained invalid factual premises that infringed on his constitutional rights, i.e., reading that Aldrich was masturbating “in front of” a minor when in fact he was in front of his web camera. The Court held that there is no constitutionally significant difference between masturbating in front of a minor in person versus doing so via web camera.

Downward variance upheld for a defendant convicted of making sexually explicit films with minors where the sentencing factors supported the sentence as reasonable.

Monday, April 27th, 2009

U.S. v. IREY, 2009 WL 806860 (11th Cir. March 31, 2008)

Mr. Irey was convicted of using minors outside the United States for the purpose of making child pornography. The defendant made repeated trips to Cambodia on sex tours and videotaped himself having sex with minors, some of which depicted graphic sex acts and torture. The appellate court described the crime as “horrific.” Nevertheless it pointed out that defendant presented evidence through a psychologist who submitted a psychosexual report, that the defendant was treatable, was a medium to medium low risk of recidivism, and could be successful in supervised release after treatment. The defendant’s family testified he was a wonderful husband father and person and that he embraced treatment, he had been acting as a peer mentor to others in narcotics and alcoholic anonymous, and that the family would remain supportive. The district court also noted his age of 50. His guideline range was the statutory maximum of 360 months with a minimum sentence of 180 months, the statutory minimum. Though he was sentenced to 210 months and given a lifetime of supervised release, the government appealed. The Court reaffirmed that a party challenging the sentence has the burden of establishing the sentence is unreasonable in light of both the record and the factors of § 3553(a) factors. It reviewed the procedure a sentencing court must follow: First, consult the sentencing guidelines and calculate the correct guidelines sentence; Second, consider the factors listed in 3553(a). The Court found no procedural error in determining the applicable guidelines sentence; it rejected the government’s argument that the sentence was too lenient. The Court said that even though it may disagree with a sentence, it would not second guess the district court decision where as here the sentencing judge took the sentence seriously, proceeded thoughtfully and the sentence was reasoned. The court did consider the factors of §3553(a). The Court of Appeals did not second guess the district court as it respects the district court as a sentencer and accepted the sentence as it “was within the outside borders for a reasonable sentence for this kind of case.”