U.S. v. Peter J. Mitchell, (SDGA April 22, 2009)
This case involves an appeal from a judgment entered after a guilty plea convicting Peter Mitchell of one count of receipt of electronic images of child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §2252A(a)(2)(2006). The guilty plea preserved Mitchell’s right to appeal from the denial of his motion to suppress the evidence obtained from the hard drive of his computer after it was seized from his home. The principle issue raised on appeal turns on the reasonableness of a delay of twenty-one days in obtaining a search warrant after the seizure of the hard drive.
On February 22, 2007, ICE Special Agent Thomas West and FBI Special Agent Josh Hayes entered Peter Mitchell’s residence with permission to speak with him about an ongoing investigation involving child pornography. In response to the agent’s questioning, Mitchell told the agents that there were two personal computers in his residence-a laptop upstairs and a desktop downstairs-and that “yes probably” the computers contained “illegal contraband” and child pornography. Mitchell then consented to the search of both computers, identifying the desktop computer as the one containing child pornography. ICE Special Agent West promptly retrieved the computer’s hard drive and both agents left Mitchell’s residence with only the desktop hard drive at approximately 12:00 pm that same day.
However, no search warrant was obtained until almost three weeks later. On Sunday, February 25, 2007, ICE Special Agent West traveled to Virginia for a two-week training course and did not make application for a search warrant for the hard drive until March 15, 2007, three days after his return, and twenty-one days after the initial seizure. Only then did West access Mitchell’s hard drive and discover images of child pornography.
Mitchell, consenting probable cause, argues that even if the seizure was proper, the twenty-one-day delay in obtaining a search warrant was unreasonable. The Eleventh Circuit examined the twenty-one-day delay by relying upon cases from the Second and Seventh Circuits which state that, “even a seizure based on probable cause is unconstitutional if the police act with unreasonable delay in securing a warrant,” and that “[T] he reasonableness of the delay is determined ‘in light of all the facts and circumstances,’ and ‘on a case-by-case basis.” See United States v. Martin, 157 F.3d 46, 54 (2d Cir. 1998) and Mayomi v. United States,873 F.2d 1049,1054 n.6(7th Cir. 1989). Finding that the detention of the hard drive for over three weeks before a warrant was sought constituted a significant interference with Mitchell’s possessory interest (since computers are relied upon heavily for personal and business use) the Eleventh Circuit determined that other personnell or other methods could have been employed to secure the search warrant in a timely manner since the case involved the seizure of only one hard drive. Therefore, the delay was deemed unjustifiable and unreasonable when balanced against Mitchell’s possessory rights. Concluding that the motion to suppress should have been granted, the Court reversed the judgment of conviction and remanded the case back to the District Court.
